Prompt-Injection Flow-Policy Replay
Replays an agent run to show untrusted text was gated before any sensitive action, leaking no secret.
Contract
Does Replays a recorded sample agent episode (built from synthetic, metadata-only rows) and makes visible whether the instructions the agent treated as trusted were kept separate from untrusted web, tool, or browser text before any sensitive action was taken. Row by row, the record shows where untrusted text flowed, what the policy decided for each flow (allow / warn / block / review) before the action, and that the recorded outcome leaked no secret and disclosed no trusted context. It also bundles deliberately-bad cases it must reject (e.g. untrusted text reaching a sensitive action ungated, or a account secret being exfiltrated).
Scope limit Passing result records only show this projection satisfies the named information-flow contract over synthetic, redacted, metadata-only rows; they do not prove general prompt-injection robustness, benchmark performance, live account/tool/provider safety, hidden-message handling in a real system, source-file changes, or launch-scope decision.
Run
microcosm indirect-prompt-injection-information-flow-policy-replay run-prompt-injection-bundle --input examples/indirect_prompt_injection_information_flow_policy_replay/exported_prompt_injection_flow_bundle --out receipts/runtime_shell/demo_project/organs/indirect_prompt_injection_information_flow_policy_replay
Evidence
ClassComputed projectionevidence 3/5Source-faithful refactor
Source
Paper module
Paper module Indirect Prompt-Injection Information-Flow Policy Replay